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Tax evasion and ﬁscal corruption have been a general and
persistent problem throughout history with serious economic con-
sequences, not only in transition economies, but also in countries with
developed tax systems. Generally, corruption and evasion are two
distinct phenomena, which can exist independently. But when tax
authorities are dealing with the possibility of corruption they should
consider the possibility of taxpayers who under-report their income
bribing tax inspectors. It is widely agreed that tax evasion and
corruption have several detrimental effects on the economy. The loss
of tax revenues can, in fact, imply a reduction in public services; in
addition, tax evasion and corruption can seriously harm economic
growth (amongst others, Rose Ackerman, 1975, 1978; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1993) and distort income distribution as individuals and ﬁrms
may have different opportunities for evasion (Hindriks et al., 1999).
Although there is extensive literature investigating the origins, effects
and extent of evasion and corruption from both theoretical and
empirical points of view, interaction between tax evasion and
corruption has only been partially explored. It is, in fact, only recently
that this relationship has been investigated in the literature (see
Acconcia et al., 2003). Although tax evasion can exist without
corruption and corruption can exist without tax evasion, since bribery
agreements can reduce deterrence of violation, the interaction
between evasion and ﬁscal corruption is a relevant economic
phenomenon when analyzing the behaviour of tax revenues.), raffaellacoppier@unimc.it
l rights reserved.In the pioneering model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the
relationship between tax rates and evasion is ambiguous and depends
on the utility function. A broader review of the literature reports more
generally, that theoretical predictions of the effect of tax rates on
evasion are dependent on the assumptions of themodel (Slemrod and
Yitzhaki, 2000). Fisman and Wei (2001) present a case study of tax
evasion in China: they ﬁnd that, on average, a 1% increase in the tax
rate leads to a 3% increase in evasion and, furthermore, this
relationship is not linear: the evasion elasticity is larger at a high tax
rate.
Chander and Wilde (1992) take into account the possibility of
collusion between a tax evader and an ofﬁcial auditor whose cost of
dishonesty is (relatively) low. Besley and Mclaren (1993), Chand and
Moene (1999), Hindriks et al. (1999), and Mookherejee and Png
(1995), deal with the issue of optimal remuneration of inspectors.
Besley and Mclaren (1993) compare three distinct remuneration
schemes, which provide different incentives to inspectors: efﬁciency
wages, reservation wages and capitulation wages. They characterize
the conditions under which each scheme generates the greatest
amount of tax revenues, net of administration costs. They show that
the efﬁciency wage strategy may not be a good idea most of the time.
In contrast, in our model, we do not consider the issue of optimal
remuneration of inspectors as we assume that the inspector is paid a
ﬁxed wage. Hindriks et al. (1999) consider a model where all the
actors are dishonest. They allow, however, for general remuneration
schemes and, more importantly, for extortion. They show that, as well
as losses in tax collection, themore bribes are collected, themore a tax
inspector can resort to extortion in order to collect even more. In this
case, the authors show that distributional effects of evasion and
corruption are regressive, because the richest taxpayers have most to
gain from evading taxes and are least vulnerable to extortion (as it is
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Png (1995) also consider only corruptible agents, although they
remove the exogenous matching of the auditor and the evader, which
is often-assumed in the literature. They consider it a moral hazard
problem since the inspector has to exert a costly non-observable effort
for evasion to be disclosed.
All the models described analyze the relationship between tax
revenues and the tax rate, and some of them (see Chander and Wilde,
1992; Sanyal et al., 2000) show, as does our model, that theremay be a
possibility that an increase in the tax rate could actually decrease
government revenues.
Our paper provides a study of the behaviour of ﬁscal revenues
beyondwhere there is corruption, as we also consider the relevance of
the “shame effect” linked to the possibility of the entrepreneur being
detected and reported in a corrupt transaction. When bureaucracy is
corrupt, a rise in tax rates starts off complicated strategic moves on the
part of both taxpayers and inspectors. In a corrupt administration, in
fact, a higher tax rate can represent the possibility of a higher
negotiated bribe rate: this may increase the number of corrupt tax
inspectors by overcoming the “shame” cost, while for taxpayers, a
higher tax rate creates a greater incentive to pay bribes.
In our model, we demonstrate that the relationship between the
tax rate and tax collection depends on the relevance of the “shame
effect”. In details, if the Statewants tomaximize tax revenues in a “low
shame” country, it has to set a tax rate greater than a threshold value,
because up to this value, the tax revenues increase – as the tax rate
increases – at an increasing rate; in a “high shame” country, the State
should set a tax rate equal to a threshold value because this value is a
global maximum of tax revenues with respect to t. In both cases, there
is ﬁscal corruption in the economy.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the
model, describe the timing of the game and present the results. In
Section 3 we discuss policy considerations. Section 4 concludes.2 The punishment for the entrepreneur is not a constant, but rather a function of the
investment. In this case too, based on the statements of Rose-Ackerman (1999): “On
the other side of the corrupt transaction, a ﬁxed penalty levied on bribers will lower
both the demand for corrupt services and the level of bribes. However, it will have no2. The model
Consider an economy producing a single homogeneous good y. The
economy is composed of three players: controllers, tax inspectors and
entrepreneurs. Tax inspectors cannot invest in the production activity
and earn a ﬁxed salary w. Entrepreneurs use their available capital in
the production sector. The State monitors entrepreneurs' and tax
inspectors' behavior through controllers, in order to weed out or
reduce corruption, and ﬁxes the level of the tax rate t on the product y.
The State uses its tax revenues to pay the tax inspectors' wages, and
there is no space for ﬁnancing public productive expenditure. We
assume that taxation is not distortive regarding input provision.
Entrepreneurs produce y, with technology with constant returns to
scale. Each entrepreneur is assumed below to have the same quantity
of capital k. The production function of the good only depends on the
capital and the natural state that may occur. Indeed with a probability
(1−δ) production will be y=ak, while with a probability δ an
adverse natural statewill occur, productionwill not take place and the
corresponding productionwill be y=0. The tax inspector, who checks
whether the tax payment is correct, is able to tell which of the two
natural states have occurred for each entrepreneur. It is common
knowledge that the tax inspector1 is corruptible, in the sense that he
pursues his own interest and not necessarily that of the State; in other
words, the tax inspector is open to bribery. The tax inspector, in the
case of the “good” natural state and in exchange for a bribe b, can offer
the entrepreneur the opportunity of reporting that the “bad” natural
state has arisen. In this case, the entrepreneur could refuse to pay the1 The inspector is assumed to have monopolistic power, meaning that an
entrepreneur is seen by only one inspector and cannot turn to other inspectors to be
treated differently.bribe (bd being the bribe requested by the tax inspector), or agree to
pay the bribe and negotiate the amount with the inspector.
The State checks on the behavior of entrepreneurs and tax
inspectors. Let qa [0,1] be the exogenous monitoring level imple-
mented by the State; then q is the probability of being detected, given
that corruption has taken place. The entrepreneurs incur a punish-
ment equal to ck where ca [0,1].2 We assume that the entrepreneurs
are not homogeneous agents, and more precisely, the j-th entrepre-
neur attributes a subjective value cjk to the objective punishment –
depending on his own “shame effect” – when the corrupt transaction
is detected. The entrepreneur, if detected, must pay taxes ty,
reputation cost cj, but he is refunded the cost of the bribe paid to
the tax inspector.3
2.1. The game: description and solution
Given the model just described, the economic problem can be
formalized by the following two-period game.
In what follows, we refer to the entrepreneur payoff by a
superscript (1) and to the inspector payoff by a superscript (2): they
represent respectively the ﬁrst and the second element of the payoff
vector π_ i,i=1,2,3,4.
At the outset of the game, Nature decides in which state the
entrepreneurs ﬁnd themselves with their consequent level of activity.
(1) In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the tax inspector checks the
entrepreneurs’ production. If a “bad” natural state occurs, then
the tax inspector reports that no tax is owed and in this case,
the game ends. Otherwise, if there is a “good” natural state, the
tax inspector decides whether to ask for the bribe bd and to
report that the “bad” natural state has arisen, and that the
entrepreneur need not pay any tax.
(1.1) If bd=0 no bribe is asked for, the payoff vector for the
entrepreneurs and tax inspectors is:
π
P 2 = ak 1− tð Þ;wð Þ ð1Þ
The game ends in the equilibrium without corruption.
(1.2) Otherwise, let bdN0 be the positive bribe asked for by the
tax inspector, the game continues to stage two.
(2) At stage two the entrepreneur decides whether to negotiate the
bribe or turn it down.
(2.1) If the entrepreneur refuses the bribe, then the payoff
vector is given by:
π
P 3 = ak 1− tð Þ;wð Þ ð2Þ
Then in this case, the game ends. There is no penalty for
the tax inspector.
(2.2) Otherwise the negotiation starts and the two parties will
ﬁnd the bribe corresponding to the Nash solution to a
bargaining game (bNB) so the game ends. This bribe is the
outcome of a negotiation between the inspector and the
entrepreneur, who will be assumed to share a given
surplus. The payoffswill dependonwhether the inspector
and the entrepreneur are detected (with probability q) or
not detected (with probability (1−q)). There is nomarginal impact once the briber passes the corruption threshold. To have a marginal
effect, the penalties imposed on bribe payers should be tied to their gains (their excess
proﬁts, for example)”. pp. 55.
3 This assumption can be more easily understood when there is extortion by the tax
inspector rather than corruption.
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entrepreneur decides to pay the bribe, the expected
payoff vector is given by:
π
P 4 = ak 1− qtð Þ− cjkq − 1− qð Þb;w + 1− qð Þb
 
ð3Þ
The game ends in the equilibrium with corruption and
evasion.
We ﬁrst determine the equilibrium bribe bNB.5
Proposition 1. Let q≠1.6 Then there exists a unique non negative bribe
(bNB), as the Nash solution to a bargaining game, given by:
bNB = μ akt −
qkcj
1− qð Þ
 
: ð4Þ
where μu ee + β is the share of the surplus that goes to the tax inspector
and β and ε are the parameters that can be interpreted as the bargaining
strength measures of the entrepreneur and the tax inspector respectively.
As a consequence of the model, if we assume that the tax inspector
and the entrepreneur share the surplus on an equal basis, then we
arrived at the standard Nash case, when ε=β=1. In this case the
bribe is:
bNB =
akt
2
−
qkcj
2 1− qð Þ : ð5Þ
In otherwords, the bribe represents 50% of the savingwhich comes
fromnot paying taxes, net of reputation cost for the entrepreneur, if he
is found out.
Wewill refer hereafter to the symmetry of the standard Nash bribe
and study explicitly our problem for μ = 12.
7
The payoff vector is given by:
π
P 4 = ak −
akt 1 + qð Þ
2
−
cjkq
2
;w +
akt 1− qð Þ
2
−
cjqk
2
 
ð6Þ
We now discuss the behavior of the equilibrium bribe in Eq. (5)
with respect to the tax rate and monitoring level.
(1) Bribe vs. tax rate. By analyzing this derivative we observe that:
AbNB
At
=
ak
2
N 0 ð7Þ
Therefore, increasing the tax rate also increases the potential
surplus that the tax inspector and entrepreneur can share, thus
increasing the bribe;
(2) Bribe vs. monitoring level. In this case, we have:
AbNB
Aq
= −
kcj
2 1−qð Þ2 b0 ð8Þ4 The results do not depend on the existence of a cost for the tax inspector who is
corrupted and detected.
5 See Appendix A for the proof.
6 If q=1 this stage of the game is never reached.
7 In an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, the surplus is shared unequally
between the tax inspector and the taxpayer and thus the bribe paid to the
inspector increases as the inspector's bargaining strength increases, expressed as ε.
In fact, by computing this derivative we observe that:
AbNB
Aμ
= akt − qkc
1− qð ÞN 0:
Increasing the bargaining power of the tax inspector increases the bribe which he
can obtain.Therefore, increasingmonitoring reduces thepotential surplus that
the tax inspector and entrepreneur can share, thus reducing the bribe.
By solving the static game, we can prove the following proposition8:
Proposition 2. Let 0V qcja 1− qð Þ = t⁎V1.
9 Then,
(a) If ta [0,t⁎] the j-th entrepreneur will ﬁnd it worthwhile to be
honest and then the game ends with the payoff vector:
π
P 2 = ak 1− tð Þ;wð Þ:
(b) If ta [t⁎,1] the j-th entrepreneur will ﬁnd it worthwhile to be
corrupt and then the game ends with the payoff vector:
π
P 4 = ak −
akt 1 + qð Þ
2
−
cjkq
2
;w +
akt 1− qð Þ
2
−
cjqk
2
 
:
Depending on the value of the tax rate t, two sub-game perfect
Nash equilibria can be found:
• If tb t⁎, what the entrepreneur obtains by evading taxes is not
enough to make up for his own expected reputation cost. With this
in mind, the tax inspector will not ask the entrepreneur for a bribe.
The game, therefore, ﬁnishes with the entrepreneur paying taxes.
There is no sufﬁcient margin for agreeing on a positive bribe with
the tax inspector;
• If t≥ t⁎, the entrepreneur ﬁnds it worthwhile to start a negotiation
with the tax inspector. Thus the surplus to be shared between the
entrepreneur and the inspector will keep a negotiation going, the
outcome of which is the bribe corresponding to the Nash solution to
a bargaining game.
In order to extend these considerations, we also analyze the
solution of the game with respect to reputation cost cj. Deﬁne
c⁎ : =
at 1− qð Þ
q
: ð9Þ
If t≥ t⁎, then cj≤c⁎; if tb t⁎, then cjNc⁎. c⁎ is assumed to be an
honesty threshold. Moreover, since by deﬁnition c⁎a [0,1], then there
exists a minimal threshold for the monitoring activity
qB : =
at
at + 1
ð10Þ
such that q≥q°. Thus, the honesty threshold c⁎ is well deﬁned when
the monitoring level is great enough. We will suppose q≥q° in the
remaining part of the paper. Tax revenues depend on the hypothesis
made about the distributional cost: if the speciﬁc j-th reputation cost
is lower than c⁎, the entrepreneur ﬁnds it worthwhile to evade all
taxes; vice versa, if the j-th entrepreneur's reputation cost is greater
than c⁎ then the entrepreneur will be honest.
The cumulative density of probability deﬁnes the distribution of
individual costs F(cj), where j is the speciﬁc entrepreneur. We assume
that the distribution of entrepreneurs' costs is of the Kumaraswamy
type with real parameters α1 and α2. This choice is driven by two
facts: ﬁrst of all, the Kuramaswamy distribution belongs to the huge
family of two-parameter probability laws. Thus, the choice of the
Kuramaswamy distribution is not restrictive. Moreover, and differ-
ently from the other two-parameter distributions (the most famous
being Beta distribution) we have an explicit formula for the
cumulative density function and thus mathematical tractability.
The cumulative density function for the costs is:
F cj
 
=
Z cj
0
α1α2c
α1−1 1−cα1−1
 α2−1dc = 1− 1−cα1j
 α2
: ð11Þ8 See Appendix B for the proof.
9 We are assuming that qcj≤a(1−q) that is, the cost of corruption expected by the
entrepreneur is lower than the relevant beneﬁts expected.
Fig. 1. Tax revenues in a “low shame” country.
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different reputation cost cj, and the entrepreneur's behavior is
assumed to be inﬂuenced by his own cost cj, as evidence suggests.
The fraction of corrupted entrepreneurs i.e., with a shame cost
cj≤c⁎ is given by
F c⁎
 	
= 1− 1− c⁎
 	α1 	α2 ð12Þ
Analogously, we have that
1− F c⁎
 	
= 1− c⁎
 	α1 	α2 ð13Þ
is the fraction of honest entrepreneurs, i.e., with a shame cost cjNc⁎.
Substituting Eq. (9) in Eqs. (12) and (13), we obtain the fraction of
corrupted and honest entrepreneurs respectively:
F c⁎
 	
= 1− 1− at 1−qð Þ
q
 α1 α2
and
1− F c⁎
 	
= 1− at 1−qð Þ
q
 α1 α2
We can analyze the behavior of corruption (takes as the number of
corrupt entrepreneurs)with respect to the tax rate andmonitoring level.
(1) Corruption vs. tax rate. By analyzing this derivative we observe
that, if α2N1, then:
AF c⁎
 	
At
=
α1α2a 1− qð Þ
q
1− at 1−qð Þ
q
 α1 α2−1 at 1−qð Þ
q
 α1−1
N 0:
ð14Þ
Therefore, increasing the tax rate also increases the potential
surplus that the tax inspector and entrepreneur can share, thus
increasing corruption, irrespective of the speciﬁc distribution of
shame cost;
(2) Corruption vs. monitoring level. In this case, if α2N1, then:
AF c⁎
 	
Aq
= − α1α2at
q2
1− at 1−qð Þ
q
 α1 α2−1 at 1−qð Þ
q
 α1−1
b0:
ð15Þ
Therefore, increasing monitoring reduces the potential surplus
that the tax inspector and entrepreneur can share, thus reducing
corruption.
We also notice that corruption does not depend on the distribution
of the surplus between the inspector and the tax evader, but only on
the amount of the surplus τ. On an aggregate level, the tax revenues,
with a tax rate ﬁxed at t, will be equal to the tax paid by thosewho ﬁnd
themselves in a positive natural state (with probability (1−δ)) and
who have a reputation cost which leads them to be honest, and those
who are corrupt, but are discovered in the act of corruption:
E t; qð Þ = atk 1− 1− c⁎ 	α1 	α2
  1− δð Þq + atk 1− c⁎ 	α1 	α2 1− δð Þ:
ð16Þ
The presence of the reputation costs in Eq. (16) and of an honesty
threshold c⁎ allows us to distinguish honest entrepreneurs, who pay
taxes, from the others.1010 If t=1, then it is reasonable to suppose that all entrepreneurs are corrupt,
independently on the reputation cost threshold c⁎. In this case the tax revenues are
paid only by those entrepreneurs who have been found out: E(1)=(1−δ)akq.By substituting c⁎ with its expression in Eq. (9), a straightforward
computation allows us to rewrite E(t,q) in Eq. (16) as follows:
E t; qð Þ = 1− δð Þatk q − q − 1ð Þ 1− at 1−qð Þ
q
 α1 α2 
: ð17Þ
2.2. Comparative statics
We would now like to provide a sensitivity analysis of E with
respect to t and q.
We perform a numerical analysis of the behavior of E with respect
to t and q, in order to avoid the complexity of the closed form results
and propose a more intuitive description of the real situation.
We set δ=0.5, k=1, three different values for the capital
productivity parameter: α=0.5;1;2, and three different distributions
of the reputation costs (α1=α2=2; α1=2 and α2=5; α1=5 and
α2=2).When α1=α2=2, we have symmetry among the agents with
respect to the reputation costs; if α1=5 and α2=2, then we observe
asymmetry on the right-hand side of the distribution curve, which
means a high level of reputation costs and describes populations with
a “high shame effect”; the case α1=2 and α2=5 is the converse: the
asymmetry is on the left-hand side of the distribution curve, and we
have populations with a “low shame effect”.
Generally, ceteris paribus, we observe three effects of the tax rate
on tax revenues:
(1) as the tax rate increases, revenues increase, because those who
are still honest pay more taxes;
(2) as the tax rate increases, the number of honest entrepreneurs
decreases and thus revenues go down. Moreover, the number of
corrupted entrepreneurs increases and the number of undis-
covered entrepreneurs grows;
(3) as the tax rate increases, revenues from entrepreneurs
discovered in corrupt transactions increase.
As we can observe (see Figs. 1 and 2), some considerations emerge
from the results of our analysis.
For “low shame” countries (see Fig. 1), revenues increase as t
increases. This behavior explains that revenues growwith t because the
reduction of tax revenues due to Eq. (2) is lesser than the positive terms
due to the sumof Eqs. (1) and (3). In detail, we have that, if a low level of
themonitoring parameter q is ﬁxed, there exists a tax rate threshold t1,q
such that E(t,q) is concave for tb t1,q and convex otherwise. The shape of
the surface describes this change in concavity more remarkably when a
is small. The growth of tax revenues is faster for high values of the tax
rates, since most populations with low shame do not appreciate the
Fig. 2. Tax revenues in a “high shame” country.
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between thepositive termsdue toEqs. (1) and (3) and thenegative term
due to Eq. (2) increases, and t1,q can be viewed as a “relevant tax rate”.
When q is big enough, we do not observe a change in the behavior of
the population,which is globally indifferent to the tax rate. The function
E(t,q) does not present changes in concavity, and seems to be linearwith
respect to t. This fact describes the evidence that a properly monitored
population pays taxes, even if the individuals have low shame.
Therefore, for high monitoring levels, our analysis does not allow us to
distinguish populations with low or high shame effects, and the tax
revenues generally grows with t.
For “high shame” countries (see Fig. 2), when the monitoring
activity is low, the tax revenues are bigger those the ones in countries
with a low shame effect, as they evidently should be. Nevertheless, if a
small value of q is ﬁxed, there is a tax rate threshold t2,q such that E(t,
q) decreases for tN t2,q and increases for tb t2,q. Hence, the tax rate t2,q
is a global maximum of E(t,q) with respect to t. This fact is in
agreement with the evidence that an excessive increase in tax rate
implies that a large part of the population “becomes dishonest”. The
effect of Eqs. (1) and (3) loses quantitative relevance with respect to
the negative terms in Eq. (2), and the tax revenues invert their
tendency: from growing to falling. If q is ﬁxed at a small enough level,
then t2,q is a Laffer-type optimal tax rate, and E(t2,q,q) is the Laffer-type
optimal tax revenues that a country can obtain. Also in this case, the
phenomenon is more remarkable when a is small. If q is big enough,
as we said above, the behavior of the tax revenues surface is the same
as that in the low shame countries.
For “middle shame” countries, the tax revenues behave analo-
gously to the case of the high shame countries, but the surface is
smoother. The aggregate effect of Eqs. (1) and (3) is greater than the
reduction effect of Eq. (2) for small tax rates.
We proceed now to the analysis of revenues E with respect to the
parameter q, by formalizing the following result.11
Proposition 3. Fix ta [0,1]. If α2N1, then E(t,q) is increasing w.r.t. q, for
each ta [0,1].
Proposition 3 provides a general result: increasing monitoring
reduces the potential surplus that the tax inspector and the
entrepreneur can share. Therefore corruption reduces and revenues
increase.11 See Appendix C for the proof.3. Policy consideration
In this section we use the results derived above to assess the
normative implications of our model of tax evasion and corruption.
The results of our model are certainly inﬂuenced by two important
assumptions relating to the behavior of the State.
• No budget constraint is included and, therefore, several very
concrete requirements have been excluded, regarding those coun-
tries which are obliged to adhere to the agreement for stability and
growth and a well-balanced State budget.
• Public expenditure is not productive but is used exclusively for the
inspectors' wages. If this were not so, greater ﬁscal income might
lead to lower accumulation for the entrepreneur, but to higher
productive costs for the State. Therefore, an important issue might
be whether private expenditure (entrepreneurs' investment) is
more productive than public spending.
Let us brieﬂy summarize the ﬁndings obtained so far. If the tax rate
increases, then tax revenues change, depending on the shame costs.
Simultaneously, the corruption level also grows, because the number
of corrupted entrepreneurs increases.
The State could choose to achieve different policy objectives in this
context. If the State is operating over the short term, its goals could be
to maximize tax revenues or eradicate corruption. We have demon-
strated that the tax rate inﬂuences on the revenues and the level of
corruption. We have, in fact, shown that corruption increases as the
tax rate increases. Therefore, the State could choose to achieve the
following policy objectives: maximize tax revenues or weed out
corruption.
As there is no equilibrium which maximizes tax revenues with
zero corruption, the State must choose what, on the basis of its own
preferences, is best for society:
• if the State wants to maximize tax revenues, depending on the
shame effect (low or high), it has to set:
⁎ in a low-shame country, a tax rate greater than t1,q, because
beyond this value, tax revenues increase – as the tax rate increases
– at an increasing rate;
⁎ in a high-shame country, a tax rate equal to t2,q because this value
is a global maximum of E(t,q) with respect to t.In both cases there
is corruption in the economy.
• if the State wants to weed out corruption, it has to set the tax rate at
t=0. In this way, there are no incentives for corruption. In such an
equilibrium, the State does not receive revenues. This fact explains
the persistence of corruption.
Remark 1. Let us extend the model in order to consider an objective
prison sentence m for the entrepreneur and the tax inspector, due to
tax evasion. We ﬁnd a threshold value of tax rate in correspondence of
which there is not corruption and the tax revenues are different from
zero. Indeed, the introduction of a prison sentence reduces the surplus
of the entrepreneur of being corrupt. More precisely, the number of
corrupt entrepreneurs becomes:
F c⁎
 	
= 1− 1− at 1−qð Þ
q
−m
 α1 α2
;
and therefore there exists a critical tax rate tBm =
mq
a 1 − qð Þ≠ 0 which
weeds out corruption.
4. Conclusions
The present paper provides a study of the behaviour of ﬁscal
revenues, where there is evasion and ﬁscal corruption. In our model,
the relationship between the tax rate and tax revenues depends on
the “inner honesty” of society. We demonstrate that a Laffer-type
1244 R. Cerqueti, R. Coppier / Economic Modelling 26 (2009) 1239–1244optimal tax rate exists only in countries with a “high shame” effect:
in this case there is a global maximum of ﬁscal revenues with respect
to the tax rate. In countries with a “low shame” effect, tax revenues
grow as the tax rate does. More speciﬁcally, there is a threshold value
for the tax rate where the increasing rate of the tax revenues begins
to reduce.
From a normative point of view, an optimal level of taxation exists
both for “high shame” and “low shame” countries, which permits
governments to maximize ﬁscal revenues.
Appendix A. The Nash bargaining bribe
Let π_Δ=π_4−π_3=πΔ(1), πΔ(2) be the vector of the differences in the
payoffs between the case of agreement and disagreement between
inspector and entrepreneur about the bribe. In accordance with
generalized Nash bargaining theory, the division between two agents
will be solved by the following optimization problem:
max
baRþ
π 1ð ÞΔ
h iβ  π 2ð ÞΔ
h ie ð18Þ
in formula
max
baRþ
ak 1−tqð Þ−cjkq− 1−qð Þb−ak 1−tð Þ
h iβ
w + 1−qð Þb−w½ e ð19Þ
that is the maximum of the product between the elements of π_Δ and
where [(ak(1− t)),w] is the point of disagreement, i.e., the payoffs
that the entrepreneur and the inspector respectively would obtain if
they did not come to an agreement. It is now easy to check that the tax
inspector gets a share μ = ee + β of the surplus τ, i.e., the bribe is
b=μτ. The surplus τ is the saving which comes from not paying
taxes, net of reputation cost that awaits the entrepreneur if he is found
out: τ = akt − qcjk1− qð Þ.
Then the bribe bNB is an asymmetric (or generalized) Nash
bargaining solution and is given by:
bNB = μ akt −
qkcj
1− qð Þ
 
ð20Þ
that is the unique equilibrium bribe in the last subgame, ∀q≠1.
Appendix B. Solution to the static game
The static game is solved with the backward induction method,
which allows us to identify the equilibria. Starting from stage 2, the
entrepreneur needs to decidewhether to negotiate with the inspector.
Both payoffs are then compared, because the inspector asked for a
bribe.
Stage II At stage two the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe if, and
only if
πP
1ð Þ
4 z πP
1ð Þ
3 Z
ak 1− t 1 + qð Þ
2
 
−
kqcj
2
 
zak 1− tð ÞZ
ð21Þ
tz
qcj
a 1− qð Þ = t
⁎ ð22Þ
Stage I Going up the decision-making tree, at stage one the tax
inspector decides whether to ask for a positive bribe or not.
• Let tz qcja 1 − qð Þ = t⁎ then the tax inspector knows that if he asks for a
positive bribe, the entrepreneur will accept the negotiation, and theﬁnal bribe will be bNB. Then at stage one, the tax inspector asks for a
bribe if, and only if
πP
2ð Þ
4 NπP
2ð Þ
2 Zw +
akt 1− qð Þ
2
−
qkcj
2
N w ð23Þ
that is:
tz
qcj
a 1− qð Þ = t
⁎ ð24Þ
If t≥ t⁎, then the tax inspector will ask for the bribe bNB and the
entrepreneur will accept.
• Let tb qcja 1− qð Þ = t⁎ then the tax inspector knows that the entrepre-
neurs will not accept any possible bribe, so he will be honest and he
will ask the entrepreneurs for tax payment.
Appendix C. Tax revenues vs. tax rate
The function E admits continuous partial derivative w.r.t. q, and so
we have to show that AE t;qð Þ
Aq N 0. A simple computation gives
AE t; qð Þ
Aq
= 1−δð Þatk|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ} 1− 1− at 1−qð Þq
 α1 α2−1
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}  1−
at 1−qð Þ
q
 α1
1 +
α1α2
q
  
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
8<
:
9=
;
= I1  1− I2  I3f g;
ð25Þ
and the deﬁnition of the I Vs reﬂects the underbrace symbols.
I1 is always greater than 0. If α2N1, then I2a 0;1ð Þ; moreover,
I3 b1. Hence, we have AE t;qð ÞAq N 0.References
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